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Abstract: This study critically compares the forms of conflict respectively celebrated by Nietzsche and 
Lyotard. I scrutinize whether Lyotard‟s „agonism‟ can validly claim a Nietzschean heritage. In Section One, I 
undertake an exegesis of Nietzsche‟s account of the ancient Greek agon. In the subsequent three sections of 
the paper I then argue that neither Lyotard‟s linguistics, nor his thoughts concerning the self, freedom and 
political organisation, can justifiably be classified „agonistic‟ in any Nietzschean sense; on the other hand, it is 
contended that both Nietzsche‟s account of agency and his political thoughts exhibit a thoroughgoing 
agonism.  
 
Questo studio mette a confronto criticamente le forme di conflitto analizzate, rispettivamente, da Nietzsche e 
Lyotard. L‟Autore indaga se l‟„agonismo‟ di Lyotard possa validamente essere ritenuto un‟eredità 
nietzscheana. Nella Prima sezione, porta avanti un‟esegesi della tesi di Nietzsche sull‟agon nella Grecia 
antica. Nelle successive tre sezioni del saggio, quindi, mostra come né la linguistica di Lyotard, né le sue idee 
sul sé, la libertà e l‟organizzazione politica, possano a buon diritto essere considerati „agonali‟ in senso 
nietzscheano; d‟altra parte, si sostiene che sia le tesi di Nietzsche sull‟agire sia il suo pensiero politico 
mostrino un penetrante approccio agonico. 
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*** 
 
Introduction 
 
As the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) informs us, the noun „agon‟ is of ancient Greek 
origin and initially signified «„a gathering or assembly‟ (…) esp. for the public games; hence 
„the contest for the prize at the games‟.» So, by extension, it has subsequently come to 
mean «any contest or struggle.»1 Whereas Nietzsche understands the word specifically in 
the context of the ancient Greek contest (as his early essay Homer’s Wettkampf [1872] 
indicates), its meaning is more ambiguous within the postmodern lexicon. Despite this 
ambiguity, the idea of the „agon‟ occupies a prominent place within the conceptual 
armature of postmodernist thinkers – and this is particularly the case in the work of Jean-
François Lyotard, whose understanding of the agon I will be scrutinising in the following 
study2. 
Throughout his work, Lyotard repeatedly calls for a society structured around 
„agonistics‟3 and, in The Postmodern Condition, to gloss his use of this word, he instructs 
readers to «see F. Nietzsche, Homer’s Contest» (PMC, fn.35). Indeed, picking up on this, 
many commentators seem perfectly at ease speaking uncritically of Lyotard‟s „agonistic‟ 
philosophy and Nietzsche in the same breath.4 As shall be argued below, however, far more 
caution ought to be exercised before Lyotard‟s thought is accepted as agonistic in any 
Nietzschean sense. To be sure, it would appear that as far as sustained comparative studies 
of Nietzsche and Lyotard – let alone the specifically „agonistic‟ aspects of their philosophies 
                                                          
1 Agon, n., in OED Online, <http://oed.com/view/Entry/4087?redirectedFrom=agon> [accessed 5 August, 
2012]. 
2 For another example, see Foucault (1983), p. 222. 
3 See e.g. TD, p.26; JG, pp.80–1; and PMC, pp.16–7. 
4 See e.g. Weber, A. (1990), p.145; and Cox (1999), p. 145. 
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– are concerned, there is a conspicuous critical vacuum.5 It is conspicuous because there is 
a discernable parallelism running through their work, insofar as both endeavour to 
formulate an account of how human freedom can be attained through the management of 
various conflicts. Nevertheless, throughout, there remain paradigmatic divergences in the 
conclusions at which they arrive; indeed, the thesis this paper intends to defend is that, 
despite the convergences in their thought, whereas Nietzsche‟s wider philosophy can 
justifiably be considered agonistic (according to the criteria presented in HC), Lyotard‟s 
cannot. 
With this in mind, in the first section of this study I, undertake an exegesis of HC in 
order to establish the core features of the Nietzschean agon. In the following section I then 
examine the extent to which Lyotard‟s conflict-based theory of language exhibits these 
features, arguing that Lyotard disproportionately valorises the disunity of language in a 
manner uncharacteristic of Nietzsche‟s understanding of the agon. In Section Three, I then 
compare their respective philosophies of the self and freedom. Nietzsche and Lyotard 
similarly reject the notion of the monadic causa sui self, reconceiving of it as a multiplicity; 
however, I argue that whereas Nietzsche‟s account of freedom underlines the need to unify 
this multiplicity in a fashion analogous to the agon, Lyotard‟s repudiates any such 
unification in favour of further fragmenting the self. The final section then shows how their 
politically orientated thoughts can be viewed as attempts to propagate and safeguard their 
differing conceptions of the free self. Here I contend that both their theories of freedom 
require domination and the imposition of unifying structures on the diversity of cultural 
and discursive practices; however, while Nietzsche consciously embraces such necessities 
in his agonistic aristocratism, Lyotard‟s pagan politics is unsuccessful in its „un-agonistic‟ 
attempt to suppress them. Though I thus conclude that Lyotard‟s philosophy should 
therefore not be classified agonistic, I also suggest, by way of postscript, that aspects of it 
may still be assimilated into a Nietzschean account of social evolution. 
 
1) Harmony in Dissonance: The Agon 
 
Homer’s Contest presents itself, from the outset, as a revaluation of values – namely 
humankind‟s capacity for envy, ambition and competition. Nietzsche wants to contest the 
modern day prejudice that these capacities are „evil‟ and ought to be repressed. Casting his 
eye back to pre-Homeric Greece, Nietzsche sees a savage world of unrelenting combat, in 
which «the cruelty of the victory [was] the pinnacle of life‟s jubilation» and many thus 
succumbed to a despairing «nausea at existence» (HC, p.97). The „Greek genius‟, however, 
responded otherwise, affirming both the exultation of victory and the accompanying 
necessity of Eris (strife, rivalry or discord) and envy.  
Subsequently, the affirmative attitude of the Greek genius came to dominate every facet 
of Hellenic thought and practice.6 It is important to note, however, that not all forms of 
strife were encouraged. Following Hesiod, Nietzsche identifies two forms of Eris: 1) the 
destructive, pre-Homeric form – a war of all against all in which one strives to win by 
destroying one‟s competitor; and 2) the socially and individually beneficial form that 
characterises the agon, in which one aims at feeling one‟s own sense of excellence and 
power by actively surpassing one‟s opponent rather than pushing them down.7 With the 
latter form, the form valorised by Nietzsche, envy can be viewed as a positive affect, driving 
the productive contest.  
                                                          
5 However, see Weber, S. (1985) who cursorily compares Nietzsche‟s and Lyotard‟s accounts of agonistics. 
6 See Heraclitus‟ interpretation of the agon as a cosmological principle, which Nietzsche expands upon in PG 
(p. 108). 
7 See Acampora (2002), p.137. This section is indebted to Acampora‟s extensive writings on the agon. See 
esp. Acampora (2002), (2003a) and (2003b).  
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According to Nietzsche, when the „bad‟ Eris is affirmed and embraced, it can be 
harnessed and converted into the „good‟ Eris. Hence, from the chaotic world of oppressive 
tyranny and destructive chaos, a vigorous culture based on creative contest is engendered. 
The fecund belligerence of this environment, Nietzsche claims, allowed for the creation of 
great works such as those of Plato, Pindar, and Simonides (HC, p.99). Furthermore, the 
contest gathers, coheres and strengthens the Hellenic society – without the agon, says 
Nietzsche, it «only takes a panicky fright to make [the Hellenic state and individual] fall 
and smash» (HC, p.100). Indeed, Christa Davis Acampora succinctly notes how 
«competitive relations serve as an organising force of culture by bringing together diverse 
elements [and] coordinating heterogeneous interests».8  However, this unifying function of 
the agon is much more complex than it at first appears. 
As with Nietzsche‟s perspectivism, it would be a mistake to interpret the agonistic 
society as a relativistic arena of sheer dissension: within any agonal space, there is always a 
victor whose judgement or standard of measure provisionally takes precedence and must 
be obeyed within that space. Within the political domain, the perspective of this victor 
temporarily guides the state as whole. In short, the agon, in a way that is ostensibly 
Darwinistic, is geared toward the formation of strong values that bind the community. Yet 
it is also pivotal that this cohesion does not homogenise that which it unites. Heterogeneity 
must be preserved, for it is the difference (e.g. of opinion) between two entities that places 
them in a state of conflict; hence, in this respect, consensus is detrimental to the agon. So, 
though the agon plays a unifying role, it is not intended to completely harmonise the 
competing elements. One can therefore see how, for Nietzsche, the excellence of Greek 
culture emerged from the careful balance of harmony and dissonance – what could 
perhaps be called a harmony in dissonance. 
However, because the agon promotes the strongest individual into a position of power, 
this ethos based on contest has a tendency to produce despots whose totalitarian rule 
favours a total harmony based on terror. Due to this, the balance upon which the agon 
rests is precarious – a danger Nietzsche often welcomed.9 The mechanism adopted by the 
ancient Greeks to prevent disproportioned tyranny was ostracism: 
 
The pre-eminent individual is removed so that a new contest of powers can be awakened: a thought which 
is hostile to the „exclusivity‟ of genius in the modern sense, but which assumes that there are always 
several geniuses to incite each other to action, just as they keep each other within certain limits, too. That 
is the kernel of the Hellenic idea of competition: it loathes a monopoly of preponderance and fears the 
dangers of this, it desires, as protective measure against genius – a second genius (HC, p.98). 
 
Evidently, Nietzsche‟s formulation of the agon is not as Darwinian as it first seemed 
since being the „strongest‟ individual can in fact precipitate one‟s downfall.10 The pressing 
question then becomes: how does one dethrone the strongest individual? What existing 
literature on HC has failed to remark is that Nietzsche‟s account implicitly necessitates a 
degree of consensus among the other competing parties regarding the need to sustain the 
agon and depose this totalising force – particularly within the political domain, where 
usually no one person is able forcibly unseat the autocrat. A collective effort must therefore 
be made in order to carry out the ostracism. Agonistic dissensus is thus paradoxically 
maintained by an underlying consensus. Once again, however, this poise is fragile, and 
there is the ever-present risk of (re)lapsing into either pre-Homeric savagery (universal 
dissensus) or a false, decadent belief that consensus can do more than merely undergird 
fruitful conflict. Nonetheless, when this balancing act is achieved, and no single genius is 
allowed to place themselves outside of the competition, «several competing genius» «keep 
                                                          
8 Acampora (2006), p. 327.  
9 See e.g. TI, „Expeditions of an Untimely Man‟, 38; see also GS, 283. 
10 See Johnson (2010), pp. 69–71.  
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each other within certain limits» – that is, the process of limitation becomes immanent to 
the contest as each champion only reigns temporarily, until another contestant outrivals 
them. It should again be underscored, though, that what is loathed by the agon is not 
preponderance per se – the preponderance of the victor is in fact the keystone of the agon, 
giving it strength and structure – but a monopoly of preponderance. 
Despite this tendency towards domination, the strong contestant, Nietzsche argues, can 
also be self-regulating: 
 
…the aim of agonistic education was the well-being of the whole, of state society. For example, every 
Athenian was to develop himself, through competition, to the degree to which this self was of most use to 
Athens (HC, 98). 
 
Individual self-improvement is therefore aligned with, and limited by, the idea of 
collective improvement.  Moreover, also limiting the individual from within was the fear of 
divine envy, and the understanding that one should never hubristically place oneself above 
the contest of mortals since one «never has the right to enter into a contest with [the 
gods]» (HC, 97). Despite this drive to prohibit totalising structures, the three limiting ideas 
which regulate this agonistic society – namely, that the agon is the best social model (and 
threats to it ought to be ostracised); that the wellbeing of the social whole takes 
precedence; and that the gods exist and should be revered – are, contradictorily, all 
totalising presuppositions. Without these putative linchpins, the agonistic edifice lacks the 
requisite limiting factors needed to harness „bad‟ Eris and stave off decadence and pre-
Homeric savagery. The agon is therefore unsustainable unless it is supported by certain 
totalising ideas. This is not to say these ideas are indisputable, but only that the strength of 
the agonistic state depends on their being accepted as such.  
Another aspect of the agon that should be highlighted is the way in which it forces us to 
reconceive of the idea of measure. According to Nietzsche, the agonistic contest occurs «in 
accordance with inviolable laws and standards which are immanent in that struggle» and, 
furthermore, that «the judges themselves [seem] to be striving in the contest» (PG, p.109; 
my emphasis). The agonistic state, then, affirms the idea of nature as «indifferent without 
measure» (BGE, 9) – i.e. the idea that there are no given, fixed or transcendent criteria for 
measurement. Nevertheless, although Nietzsche censured the notion of dogmatic measure, 
he was equally critical of measurelessness.11 The agon, an apparatus for immanently 
creating and adapting strong evaluative criteria, mediates these two extremes: though 
measure is ever present, alertness to its contingent nature leaves it malleable. As Herman 
Siemens has observed, the agon «names a radically inconclusive form of conflict» since, 
within any given contest, standards of measure are prevented from crystallising to such an 
extent that they could dam up the ongoing process of revaluation.12 
Not all such criteria, though, can be treated as strictly immanent to a particular contest. 
Implied within HC, is the fact that ideal of the agon, against which all new criteria and 
victors can be evaluated («how well do they protect and propagate the agonistic ethos?»), 
is a standard of measurement that universally reigns over the agonistic state. This is 
because it is required in order to judge whether ostracism, which safeguards the agon, is 
required. This appears to be sheer hypocritical inconsistency: a totalising precept that 
there ought to be no totalising precepts. But, I would argue, this is not a weakness, in fact it 
is the very source of Hellenic strength – their greatness arising from their ability to contain 
the force of this contradiction without reconciling, and thereby neutralising it.13 To be sure, 
the need for imposing universal systems of measure – part of the Apollonian drive to order 
                                                          
11 See e.g. HH, I, 114. See also Tongeren (2002) for an in depth study of the issue of measure in Nietzsche‟s 
work. 
12 Siemens (2002), p. 97. 
13 See DW, p. 122. 
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– was always pulling against the ancient Greeks‟ contradictory awareness of the Dionysian 
disorder of reality. Indeed, appositely, Tongeren calls Nietzsche‟s „greatest discovery‟ the 
realisation that «great Greek culture emerged not so much from the victory of Apollo over 
Dionysus, but from the continuing struggle between the two».14  
Having briefly surveyed Nietzsche‟s conception of the agon, one can clearly see that it 
cannot be described as either universal dissension or „any contest or struggle‟; rather, it is 
more correctly defined by the following characteristics: 
1. It celebrates and rewards victory by granting power and legitimacy to the strongest set of 
rules and values while also ensuring these stay open to contestation. 
2. It unites heterogeneous elements a) in their participation in the practice of contest; and 
b) by authorising (albeit temporarily) a binding set of common rules and values. 
3. It promotes excellence and self-transformation. 
4. It tolerates (if not actively invites) the risk of tyranny. 
5. It depends upon the majority‟s acceptance and defence of certain totalising concepts 
(which serve to limit the hegemony of any single victor). 
6. Its fertility arises from the various contradictory oppositions – especially, that which 
exists between unity and plurality – which it manages to balance and contain in a state 
of dynamic equilibrium.  
However, it should be remarked, by way of addendum, that Homer’s Contest is not 
explicitly normative. Nietzsche is not proposing that we ought to mimic the ancient Greeks, 
but, rather, he insinuates that we should abandon our «emasculated concept of modern 
humanity» (HC, p.95) and potentiate contemporary culture. What Nietzsche‟s philological 
study ultimately reveals is that this can be achieved by rebalancing the aforementioned 
contradictions and recalling the need to embrace (and regulate) conflict, victory, 
domination, and envy in the fight against modern decadence. Nonetheless, we have 
established the basic criteria of the agon that Nietzsche at the very least implicitly endorses 
in HC; hence, we should now turn to Lyotard‟s linguistics so as to determine the extent to 
which it fulfils these features. 
 
2) Fighting Words: Lyotard’s Combative Theory of Language 
 
In PMC, Lyotard boldly states that «to speak is to fight […] and speech acts fall with the 
domain of a general agonistics» (PMC, p. 10). However, as we shall now see, Lyotard does 
not so much view this as an „agonistic‟ fight between persons but, rather, between opposed 
linguistic elements. 
The foundational premise upon which Lyotard tries to ground his thesis that language is 
in agonistic conflict with itself is that language is made up of a multiplicity of 
heterogeneous „phrase regimens‟15 and „genres of discourse‟. Every phrase, according to 
Lyotard, belongs to a specific regimen – e.g. an ostensive phrase would belong to the 
„showing‟ regime, and a definition would belong to the „describing‟ regime. Then, because 
these are heteromorphic, they are incommensurable and can neither be translated into one 
another nor used to legitimate one another – i.e. from a denotive statement such as „the 
door is open‟ one cannot deduce or justify a prescriptive such as «you should close the 
door» (TD, p. xii). Genres of discourse, on the other hand, «supply rules for linking 
together heterogeneous phrases, rules that are proper for attaining certain goals» (ibid.). 
In the artistic genre of discourse, for example, one might join questions, exclamations and 
ostensive phrases in order to make the reader feel empathy.  
Like phrase regimens, genres of discourse are also heterogeneous and 
incommensurable, each being distinguished by the idiosyncratic end it aims toward. When 
                                                          
14 Tongeren (2002), p. 13. 
15 What Lyotard, after Wittgenstein, called „language games‟ in PMC. 
© Logoi.ph – Journal of Philosophy – ISSN 2420-9775 
N. I , 3, 2015 – Playing and Thinking 
 
81 
 
one feels the inclination to say or do something, Lyotard contends, this is not the effect of 
our will (to assume so is mere vanity); rather, «our intentions are tensions […] exerted by 
genres» (TD, p.136). It should thus be underscored how, for Lyotard, the conflict described 
in his linguistics „is not between humans‟ so much as different genres of discourse (TD, p. 
137). In this section, therefore, I will be examining how this war of phrases and genres 
takes place without reference to the human subject and any potential freedom they may 
have. 
Crucially, there is no metagenre which is able to unite the heterogeneous genres with an 
overarching telos. Notwithstanding, many genres of discourse have had the pretension of 
possessing this status, something Lyotard imputes to both Enlightenment humanism and 
Hegel‟s speculative philosophy – in the case of the former, the meta-stake is the universal 
emancipation of humanity, whereas for the latter it is the realisation of Absolute Spirit (See 
PMC pp.33–5). In Section Three, we shall be returning to Lyotard‟s criticism of these 
„metanarratives‟. 
Presently, though, what remains to be seen, is why these incommensurable linguistic 
elements must necessarily be in a state of conflict instead of being able to remain discrete. 
The best way to approach this explanandum is through Lyotard‟s view of the arbitrary 
relationship between language and „reality‟ (signifier and signified) – a position most 
clearly evinced in his critique of proper names. Lyotard argues that although a name is a 
distinct or „rigid‟ node within a network of names that make up the world, it is, examined 
in isolation, nothing more than an „empty designator‟ (TD, p.48). To fulfil its ostensive role 
the name must be contextualised within a phrase and thereby given a sense (meaning). For 
example, the sense of „Stalin‟ could be „immoral megalomaniac‟ (we might derogatorily say 
of anyone: „he‟s a right little Stalin‟); conversely, though, someone might point to a poster 
of Stalin and exclaim: „the great Stalin!‟ where the sense of „Stalin‟ might be „admirable 
Russian leader‟. The number of different identifying descriptions that can be attributed to 
„Stalin‟, and the number different heterogeneous phrases and genres it can be employed 
within, is inexhaustible (TD, p. 47). According to Lyotard, with no transcendent criteria to 
judge which of these perspectives „truly‟ describe the reality signified by this name, these 
meanings vie to assert themselves over one another. Thus, «reality is not what is „given‟ to 
this or that „subject‟» (TD, p.4), rather it is fought over in the realm of semantics – as Bill 
Readings astutely notes, «Lyotard invokes the function of the name in order to make the 
point that names are not determined by reality but are the locus of a struggle as to what the 
world can be.»16  
Likewise, exactly the same kind conflict is to be found occurring over the meanings of 
whole phrases and collections of phrases. Indeed, Lyotard maintains that this struggle over 
reality is absolutely unavoidable. This is because every phrase must necessarily be linked 
on to – there cannot be a last phrase (even silence constitutes a phrase for Lyotard); 
however, without any metacriteria, how to link remains contingent (TD, p. 29). Regardless 
of what end a phrase awaiting linkage was originally put to, it can always be 
commandeered by another genre and put to a different end, given a different meaning, and 
be taken to signify a different reality. At any one time, therefore, there is a multiplicity of 
possible concatenations competing to link on to the previous phrase. For Lyotard, this 
gives rise to what he calls a differend: 
  
a differend [différend] would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably 
resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments. […] A wrong results from the fact 
that the rules of the genre of discourse by which one judges are not those of the judged genre or genres of 
discourse (TD, xi).  
 
                                                          
16 Readings (1991), p. 121. 
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Differends arise in the fight over reality because only one possible phrase and genre – 
the victor – can be actualised, whilst the others, along with their perspectives of reality, are 
silenced or „wronged‟ like the subjugated party in the above quote (TD, p.29).17 The 
consequence of this is not only that «language is in a permanent state of civil war»,18 but, 
as Manfred Frank stresses, this is a war «carried out by means of naked power and without 
an arbiter».19 Certainly, Lyotard does not see dominant linguistic structures (genres) as 
provisionally legitimate arbiters (as we might expect if the theory was truly agonistic), a 
belief which can be brought into relief by briefly explicating the macrocosmic presence of 
the differend.  
Within any period of history, Lyotard argues, the criteria or measure of one particular 
genre tends to reign supreme. Thus, within the Occident, the Enlightenment brought with 
it the dominance of the cognitive genre, and, subsequently, the onset of global capitalism 
has engendered the hegemony of the economic genre. Lyotard describes this will to 
domination as a genre‟s «wanting to have too much of it» (JG, 99), which, he believes, 
necessarily involves injustice since it silences (wrongs) the other subordinate genres. The 
preponderant genre does this by imposing its criteria of judgement, its perspective of 
reality and its definitions upon them, and in so doing gives rise to differends. Lyotard 
views this attempt to subjugate other genres as an attempt to «totalise them into a real 
unity» – a unity which, he stresses, can only ever be illusory. «The price to pay for such an 
illusion – Lyotard continues – is terror» (a concept which shall be explicated in more detail 
below); and from thence comes his postmodern rallying cry (indubitably aimed at 
Habermas‟ utopian vision of a society founded upon the totalising ideal of consensus20): 
«let us wage war on totality» (WIP, pp. 81–2). According to this model, any attempt to 
arbitrate the war of phrases and genres is therefore always illegitimate, and any unity or 
cohesion that such arbitration may bring about is always fraudulently imposed and of 
negative value. 
 
2.1) Language as a ‘Pre-Homeric’ Field of Conflict  
 
Before we try to ascertain whether Lyotard‟s model is compatible with Nietzsche‟s 
account of the agon, two pressing problems to which the former gives rise must be briefly 
examined since they raise doubts as to whether there is any linguistic conflict at all, let 
alone agonistic conflict. The first problem concerns the absolute heterogeneity of language 
and can be summed up as follows: if linguistic elements are absolutely different, then how 
can they be in conflict since, as Frank asserts, «conflicts presuppose a common mutual 
reference, as that about which there is conflict.»21 Although this problem is perhaps not as 
damning as Frank‟s critical analysis suggests, it illuminates how, in contrast to the agon, 
there is a lack of balance in Lyotard‟s account, which emphasises the difference and 
plurality within language whilst repressing the overlaps and families of resemblance that, 
as Wittgenstein notes, exist between its diverse parts.22 Thus, if we are to assent to 
Lyotard‟s combative theory of language, we must qualify his „absolute difference‟ thesis so 
that it reads: «total heterogeneity beyond the minimum unity required to allow for 
conflict.» 
The second problem specifically concerns the differend: if the defining feature of a 
differend is that the silenced linguistic element lacks the ability to articulate the fact that it 
has been wronged, then, as Alexander Weber observes, «the [repressed] variants remain 
                                                          
17 See also TD, pp. 55–6. 
18 Weber, A. (1990), p. 142. 
19 Frank (2003), p. 120. 
20 See e.g. Habermas (1991), pp. 1–68.  
21 Ibid., p.122. 
22 See Wittgenstein (2009), §67. 
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beneath the surface and hence cannot be expressed, or even proved to exist».23 How, then, 
can we ever know that a differend has occurred? Lyotard, well aware of this bind, argues 
that a differend «is signalled by what one ordinarily calls a feeling: „one cannot find the 
words‟ etc.» (TD, p.13). To insist, as Weber does, that we must be able to speak about the 
differend if it is to be taken seriously, is to impose the rules of cognitive genre on Lyotard‟s 
theory, which is precisely what Lyotard is discouraging. Because Lyotard‟s theory resists 
logocentrism and the proof criteria commanded by the cognitive genre, ultimately, as 
Williams rightly points out, «we must [either] „feel‟ his theory to be true» or turn away 
unconvinced.24 Nonetheless, Lyotard‟s appeal to feeling remains a weak form of 
argumentation, for if one does not „feel‟ the differend oneself, his combative theory of 
language falls apart since there is no further evidence that any conflict or repression has 
taken place.  
But then, even if we read Lyotard charitably on these two points – conceding that we do 
„feel‟ the differend and that language is therefore defined by conflict – it must be 
remembered that conflict remains only a necessary (as opposed to sufficient) condition for 
agonistics. To be sure, though the conflict characterising Lyotard‟s model does unite 
heterogeneous elements in combat, his interpretation of this conflict does not align itself 
with the principles of the agon. Indeed, there is one fundamental feature of his model that 
firmly precludes the agon analogy: it does not acknowledge «the exciting impulse [to 
struggle for dominance], terrible as it [is], and [regard] it as justified» (HC, p.96). Though 
Lyotard‟s study of language does, undeniably, affirm struggle per se, he does not affirm 
victory. Instead, he concentrates on the repression of the defeated party, speaking of 
victory only in terms of the „wrong‟ it entails. Furthermore, for Lyotard legitimacy is never 
granted to the triumphant genre, which can never legitimately unite other genres by 
imposing its particular measure; such ascendency is indissociable from terror, and, 
Lyotard says in a condemnatory tone, «is always assisted by the sword» (JG, p.99) – that 
is, it is always involves unjust coercion. 
In addition to the above, since Lyotard valorises the natural disunity of language, whilst 
unity and totalisation are judged as negative in value, his model is bereft of the poise that 
pervades the agon. Indeed, we are instead faced with a model far more reminiscent of 
Darwin‟s famous wedge metaphor25 – an overabundance of disunited phrases and genres 
being relentlessly driven into what are, at any one moment, a limited number of places to 
concatenate. In light of this, it seems it would be far more accurate to categorise this 
oppressive, Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes as a „pre-Homeric‟ form of conflict. 
 
3) Freedom and Intrasubjective Agonistics 
 
Turning his gaze inwards, Lyotard highlight how our epistemological separation from 
reality „in itself‟ also raises questions regarding the nature of subjectivity. In this section, I 
will argue that although Lyotard‟s critique of subjectivity is in many ways comparable to 
that of Nietzsche, a marked divergence in the two theories is revealed when they are 
compared against the criteria of the agon that were established in Section One. I will first 
briefly illustrate how both Nietzsche and Lyotard similarly reconceive of the self as 
multiple; subsequently, I shall then critically compare their thoughts on freedom to 
demonstrate that whereas Nietzsche calls for an agonistic unification of the self, Lyotard‟s 
calls for its further fragmentation. 
 
                                                          
23 Weber, A. (1990), p. 143. 
24 Williams (1998), p. 100. 
25 See Darwin (1975): „nature may be compared to a surface covered with ten-thousand sharp wedges; […] the 
one [wedge] being driven in deeply forcing others out (p. 208).  
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3.1) From Unity to Multiplicity: Rethinking the Self 
 
3.1.1) Nietzsche 
Not only does Nietzsche derogate dogmatic faith in the atomism of the soul (BGE, 12) 
but he demotes the idea of a unified subject-substance or res cogitans, which Descartes 
held to be an immediate certainty, to the status of a „perspectival illusion‟ (WP, 518; KSA 
12:2[91]). The fictive notion of a unified Cartesian „I‟ is, according to Nietzsche, fabricated 
by a process of concept formation parallel to that explicated in the previous section: an 
underlying similitude is abstracted from a multitude of unique self-experiences (WP, 485; 
KSA 12:10[19]). Nietzsche refers to this simplification of the self as „useful‟ and as „a 
condition of life‟, since it enables our survival by simplifying and making manageable the 
chaotic multiplicity of (interior) reality (WP, 492; KSA 11:4[21]; and WP 483; KSA 
11:38[3]). However, for Nietzsche, this useful fiction has become petrified in language – 
that is, in the rigid first person pronoun and the grammatical subject. Nietzsche‟s 
contention is that, forgetting the pragmatic origins of these linguistic constructions, we 
fallaciously take them to index a metaphysical truth; thus, «people came to believe in „the 
soul‟ as they believed in the grammatical subject» (BGE, 54). 
Contra the subject-substance hypothesis, Nietzsche adduces the «evidence of the [body, 
which] reveals a tremendous multiplicity» (WP, 518; KSA 12:2[91]), to suggest other, more 
accurate hypotheses such as «the „soul as subject-multiplicity‟ and the „soul as a society 
constructed out of drives» (BGE, 12). Every one of these drives – e.g. to sleep, eat, learn, 
socialise, dominate and etcetera – is then «a kind of lust to rule; each one has its 
perspective that it would like to compel all other drives to accept as a norm» (WP, 481; 
KSA 12:7[60]). 
So, what Nietzsche refers to as the „self‟ is the totality of drives that compose any 
particular human organism at any given moment. Crucially, for Nietzsche, there is no seat 
of subjectivity or ‘self’ that is external to these drives. But, if this is the case, from whence 
does our „ego‟ or feeling of „I-ness‟ come? After all, „I‟ often feel and control impulses as 
though they were impinging upon „me‟. For Nietzsche, though, the answer is 
straightforward: we simply identify our „ego‟, or „I‟, with the drive that happens to be 
preponderant, and therefore directing the human organism, at any given moment.26  
Thus, for all of the above reasons, Nietzsche, echoing Hume, asserts that the 
monadological „subject‟ or „self‟ is «not something given, it is something added and 
invented and projected behind what there is» (WP, 481; KSA 12:7[60]).27 It is nonetheless 
important to remember that Nietzsche‟s seemingly eliminitivist polemic against 
conventional philosophies of the self is not, as Tracy Strong reminds us, «a denial that 
there „is‟ such a thing as a subject, but rather a critique of the presupposition that the 
subject has a natural and given unity of any kind.»28  
 
3.1.2) Lyotard 
Like Nietzsche‟s, Lyotard‟s critique of the subject-substance hypothesis is intertwined 
with his critique of language. For Lyotard, the meaning of „the self‟ (or „I‟, or „the subject‟, 
and etcetera) is, like any other signifier, an unbounded structure, always exposed to 
alternative definitions and permutations in the reality it is held to signify. The reality of the 
self, which is always based upon the particular linguistic context in which an individual is 
positioned, is therefore not a pre-given, immediate reality (TD, 46). Hence, «philosophical 
examination never reveals […] a subject-substance. It reveals phrases, phrase universes 
and occurrences» (TD, p.97).  
                                                          
26 See D, 109; and BGE, 19; see also Parkes (1994), p. 292. 
27 Cf. Hume (1978), pp. 252–9. 
28 Strong (1985), p. 169. 
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In PMC, Lyotard, in a manner reminiscent of Foucault, is keen to criticise how closed 
definitions of the subject have, in the past, been invalidly utilised by philosophical 
movements such as Enlightenment humanism and speculative metaphysics to legitimate 
the domination of the cognitive genre. This was achieved by fraudulently placing this 
genre‟s knowledge claims within the metanarrative of either a) in the case of speculative 
metaphysics, the subject-as-spirit, or b) in the case of Enlightenment humanism, the 
emancipated rational subject.29 These closed definitions of a universal subject, were 
thereby used to forcibly unite heterogeneous phrases and genres by subjecting them to one 
evaluative criterion («to what extent do they facilitate the development of this conception 
of the subject?»). 
In spite of his denigration of these fixed definitions, Lyotard does proffer his own 
alternative. Because the reality of the subject can only ever be established locally in the 
context of particular phrases, Lyotard categorically states that «we are nothing but what 
our phrases make of us» (TWR, p.408). As Haber has observed, since the subject is viewed 
as linguistically constituted and there is no transcendental self, «whatever is true of 
language will eo ipso be true of the human/social subject».30 (As we have already found 
that Lyotard‟s model of language is not agonistic, his philosophy of the self, on this ground 
alone, already appears to not be agonistic – however, we should continue.) By this account, 
the various positions one occupies across the different types of phrases and genres of 
discourse are, like these different linguistic elements, heteromorphic and 
incommensurable. Indeed, Lyotard conceives of the self as a heterogeneous multiplicity 
«dispersed in clouds of [linguistic] elements» (PMC, p. xxiv), and, consequently, claims 
that «we are ourselves several beings» (JG, p. 51).  
However, it is important to add that Lyotard‟s description of subjectivity remains 
frustratingly underdeveloped and, as Gary Browning notes, his «derogation of the self […] 
is not supported by a sustained analysis of how the self relates to its alleged dispersion in 
multifarious language games.» 31 Though this unwillingness to describe the self with any 
finality is consistent with his view that to do so would be mere pretence, his abstruseness 
means that he fails to convincingly refute the idea that the self is at least partially unified 
(as is suggested by our discovery that linguistic elements cannot, by Lyotard‟s logic, be 
completely heterogeneous [p. 15]).32 These problems aside, it remains that Lyotard, like 
Nietzsche, rebuts the idea of the self qua substance, reconceiving of the self as multiple. As 
shall now be shown, though, their thoughts on freedom radically diverge over the question 
of how this multiplicity should be treated.  
 
3.2) Nietzsche on Freedom 
 
Throughout his work, Nietzsche discusses the idea of the free will in two contrasting 
tones. On the one hand, he dismisses it as a „fable‟ (HH, I, 39), and, on the other, he speaks 
with admiration of the „sovereign individual‟, who he calls a «master of the free will» (GM, 
II, 2).  Yet, as we shall now see, since these stances respond to distinct conceptions of free 
will – the former referring to the causa sui free will, the latter referring to free will 
understood as agency (a distinction which will be explicated) – they are not contradictory. 
Nietzsche abrogates belief in the spontaneous, causa sui free will, viewing this 
conception not only as a «type of logical rape» (BGE, 19), but also as a means for making 
                                                          
29 See PMC, p.xxiii and pp. 31–7. 
30 Haber (1994), p. 15.  
31 Browning (2000), p.119. Indeed, Browning repeatedly censures Lyotard for his inadequate account of 
subjectivity (see e.g. p. 22, p. 39, and p. 169). 
32 See also Schrag (1997) who, criticising Lyotard, claims that because there is in fact „an overlapping and 
inmixing‟ of language games, there is a corresponding degree of self-identity and unity to the self that 
traverses them (pp. 27–34). 
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the strong feel guilty for expressing their strength and allowing the weak to feel 
empowered since they can believe that they choose to be meek (GM, I, 13). Nietzsche 
argues that what is referred to as „freedom of the will‟ is in fact the pleasurable affect of 
command that the provisionally dominant drive (our „ego‟) experiences when it commands 
other, obeying drives and successfully undertakes desired actions. Upon reflection, we 
distinguish the part of ourselves that enjoyed this affect from that which obeyed. This leads 
us to fallaciously infer, après coup, the existence of a metaphysically free, and absolutely 
commanding will – i.e. a singular and fixed „doer‟ that exists outside the drives (BGE, 19). 
Freedom of the will, then, is not the cause of our actions, but is, rather an illusion to which 
those actions give rise. 
Like the fiction of a pre-given unified subject, this belief in a causa sui free will is then 
perpetuated by the grammatical structure of language. The division of the Indo-European 
sentence into subject, object and verb buttresses the illusion that there actually exists a 
metaphysically free „doer‟ doing the verb (WP, 556; KSA 12:2[152]).33 Once again, though, 
we find that Nietzsche considers this act of falsification – i.e. «our habit of regarding all 
our deeds as consequences of our will» – as vital to our survival since it allows us to think 
of ourselves as fixed and distinct points of being, that is, as individuals, which in turn 
prevents our sense of self from «vanish[ing] in the multiplicity of change» (WP, 488; KSA 
12:9[98]). Clearly, then, Nietzsche is not insisting that we do away with the sensation of 
our independent efficacy.  
In fact, just as Nietzsche criticises the idea of a causa sui free will, he is equally critical of 
what he calls the „mythology‟ of the „un-free will‟ which is employed to diminish feelings of 
responsibility (BGE, 21).34 Repackaging Kant‟s thesis in the first critique, Nietzsche tells us 
that the law of causation is a human fabrication superimposed upon „real life‟.35 We 
therefore reach the impasse Kant describes in the „Third Antinomy‟ – namely, that we are 
unable to establish whether, metaphysically, we are absolutely free or determined.36 Owing 
to this, Nietzsche‟s project was fundamentally to rethink freedom not as a state that is 
either metaphysically pre-given or foreclosed, but, instead, as one that is achieved. 
For Nietzsche, owing to the mixing of classes and races, we moderns possess an 
exceptionally multiple and internally conflictual self. The situation is analogous to that of 
the Greeks, in that we can either a) despair at this pre-Homeric anarchy of the drives and 
decadently try to seek a unity based on pacification, or b) affirm and harness the force of 
this conflict by making it agonistic (BGE, 200 and 208). There is unfortunately insufficient 
time to give a comprehensive exegesis of Nietzsche‟s account of freedom and the drives; 
however, it will suffice for the purposes of this paper to delineate some of its key features in 
order to ascertain how and why Nietzsche advises one organise one‟s self agonistically. If 
we are to understand Nietzsche‟s account of freedom at all, though, we must first define 
agency – that is, what it means to act as an agent. For this, we should invoke Al-Gazali, 
who offers us a particularly lucid and apposite definition of the genuine agent as «one (…) 
from whom the act proceeds together with the will to act by way of choice and the 
knowledge of what is willed».37 Let us now consider how Nietzsche‟s account of freedom 
embodies this conception. 
Nietzsche‟s own vision of the free agent is best encapsulated in his exalting depiction of 
the „sovereign individual‟, whom he describes as «…an autonomous, supra-ethical 
individual (…) with his own, independent, enduring will (…). This man who is now free, 
actually has the prerogative to promise, this master of the free will» (GM, II, 2). 
                                                          
33 Cf. HH, II, The Wanderer and his Shadow, 11; see also WP, 631 (KSA 12:2[139]). 
34 Compare with the hard determinism of HH. See e.g. HH, I, 18 and 106. See also Janaway (2009), p. 63 for 
a closer analysis of this shift. 
35 See Kant (2007), Transcendental Deduction, A 90–2. 
36 Ibid, pp. 409–15. 
37 Al-Gazali (1997), p. 57. 
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The importance of being able to fulfil one‟s promises is repeatedly emphasised 
throughout this section of GM. In order to have this capacity, Ken Gemes points out, one 
must first have established a stable hierarchy among one‟s drives – something Nietzsche 
does not think the average modern person has attained.38 We should now look at why such 
organisation is a prerequisite for making reliable promises and acting as an agent. 
Every drive is an impulse toward a certain end. Each drive has its own unique objective 
(HH, I, 32) that it lusts to realise by taking charge of the human organism. If the individual 
is to avoid being a „weak willed‟ «disgregation of impulses (…) lacking any systematic 
order» (one that is fickle and whose acts will feel merely capricious), there must be a firm 
ruling drive that can unify this diversity of impulses, organising them into an enduring 
power structure. Such hierarchy means that the energy of the diverse drives can be 
channelled toward a stable, primary end, thus engendering a „strong will‟ and making the 
individual reliable (able to fulfil promises) (WP, 46; KSA 13:14[219]).39 As Gemes argues, 
without this stability, «you can give no guarantee that the ascendant drive at the time of 
your making a promise will be effective when the time comes to honour that promise.»40 
However, it should also be added that „free‟, for Nietzsche, means self-determining «in the 
sense of „not being pushed and shoved, without a feeling of compulsion‟» (WLN, p.16). So, 
for Nietzsche, agency is not, as Kant and Spinoza suggest, acting independently of one‟s 
passions and desires, rather, it is acting in accordance with these compulsions provided 
they are coordinated, stable, and are not the result of external pressure applied by 
moribund moral conventions.41  
The ability to make reliable promises – i.e. ones grounded in organised compulsions 
that one can attribute to oneself – lies at the heart of what it means to be an agent. This is 
because it gives the individual a strong and steady sensation of intention, so, when the 
projected action is performed and the promise fulfilled, the individual can feel that, in the 
terms of Al-Gazali, she had knowledge of, and chose (from inner compulsion) to commit 
the act before it took place. She can thus feel that she herself genuinely commanded the 
action and that it was not an act of caprice. With this affect of command (the feeling of 
„freedom of will‟) the individual is then able, retrospectively, to feel that «the act proceeded 
together with the will to act» and therefore qualify as an agent. When Nietzsche 
encourages us to achieve freedom, then, he is, I believe, goading us to create ourselves (by 
organising our drives) in a way that maximises the frequency with which we experience 
freedom as genuine agency.  
For this to be possible, our drives must be structured by a chief impulse into a coherent, 
enduring and hierarchic totality – and indeed, Nietzsche lauds Goethe for just this, for 
«disciplin[ing] himself into a whole» (TI, Expeditions of an Untimely Man, 50). For 
Nietzsche, an inner unity must be forged if freedom is to be attained. However, this 
glorification of imposed totality seems to imply a tyranny of the soul in which 
heterogeneous drives are forced into conformity – an idea that is at odds with Nietzsche‟s 
celebration of agonistics. Upon closer inspection, though, one finds that Nietzsche did not 
want strong command and unity to be formed at the expense of plurality and struggle. 
Rather, self-governance and unity are only strong if perpetually overcoming resistances; 
hence, «the highest man would have the greatest multiplicity of drives, in the relatively 
greatest strength that can be endured» (WP, 966; KSA 11:27[59]). Nietzsche stresses the 
need to «effect a harmony and concord» between the drives, «but without the need to 
suppress them or clap them in irons» (HH, I, 276). In the same aphorism he also lays 
emphasis on the need to able to contain contradictory impulses without resolution and, he 
                                                          
38 Gemes (2009), p. 37. 
39 See also UM, III, 2 and EH, „Why I am So Clever‟, 9. 
40 Gemes (2009), p. 37. 
41 Cf. Kant (1960), p. 19; and Spinoza (1994), VP 1–20. 
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explains in BGE 284, «seat yourself on them like you would a horse». As Tongeren 
remarks, «the better horseman will not so much reduce the forces of his horse, but rather 
stimulate them while keeping them under control».42 Nevertheless, the rider of this horse 
is precariously balanced between tyranny and servitude since there is the imminent danger 
that she will either a) lose control and thus be enslaved to the anarchic whim of her diverse 
impulses, or b) oppressively tyrannise them, thus generally diminishing the capability of 
the subject taken as a whole – both of which would minimise her potential to experience 
the feeling of command and, eo ipso, achieve freedom.43  
There are a number of methods that can be employed to prevent a drive, from 
tyrannising in this way. To list a few of these, in D 109 Nietzsche tells us that to unseat or 
ostracise a „vehement drive‟ we could, for example, deprive the drive of satisfaction; or 
mentally associate its gratification with a painful thought; or even weaken ourselves as a 
whole (e.g. through fasting). He is keen to add, however, that it is not „we‟ (understood as 
separate or above the drives) that desires and undertakes this regulation or ostracism, but 
merely another drive that is vying to gain ascendency. Thus, if the strong, free (capable of 
agency) and agonistic self is to be maintained, the drive lusting for coordinated inner 
struggle, even if it usually lies dormant, must always be powerful enough to rise up, assert 
itself absolutely and thereby reinitiate the intrasubjective contest.  
So, Nietzsche‟s philosophy of the self and his conception of freedom as agency, can 
validly be classified „agonistic‟ since it calls for a) the unification of the multifarious drives 
in a state of productive conflict; b) the need to legitimate the dominance of a ruling drive 
that can effect this unification; c) the cultivation of strength in the subordinate drives and, 
by dint of this, the striving for excellence and empowering self-transformation of the 
individual taken as a whole; d) it invites the risk of tyranny by promoting a struggle for 
power among the drives; and e) the creation of an underlying, totalising drive capable of 
ousting an overly tyrannical drive. Finally, one also finds that the potency of the free 
individual arises from the internal balancing of unity and plurality, and the containment of 
contradictory drives – a harmony in dissonance emblematic of the agon. 
By Nietzsche‟s model, assuming the self to be a pre-given and metaphysically free unity 
hinders the project of self-cultivation since people falsely and complacently believe that 
they already possess what must in fact be fought for through the unification of the drives. If 
a unity is to be properly established and upheld, then, the self must continually be 
conceived of as multiple.44 However, the seductive power of language, and the illusion of 
subject-substance petrified within it, is perpetually resisting this reconception. Since «we 
cannot change our means of [linguistic] expression at will» (WP, 625; KSA 13:14[122]), 
and these means of expression act as straitjacket upon our thought, it would appear there 
is a major linguistic barrier to our attainment of freedom: one will always be seduced into 
laziness (believing oneself to already be free and unified) whenever one speaks or even 
consciously thinks. Just as Nietzsche fears „we are not getting rid of God because we still 
believe in grammar‟ (TI, ‘Reason’ in Philosophy, 5), it seems we are unable to get rid of the 
fable of a causa sui subject-substance because it is ossified within the sign-system 
humankind requires to survive.45 This is not to say that Nietzschean freedom is therefore 
defunct; rather, there exist serious obstacles to its becoming enduring and widespread, 
ones that Nietzsche would undoubtedly want us to affirm and engage with. 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 Tongeren (2002), p. 21.  
43 See WP, 778; KSA 13:14[157]. 
44 See Gemes (2009), p. 44. 
45 See also GS, 58. 
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3.3) Lyotard and the Development of the Will 
 
To illustrate his refutation of autonomy and the metaphysically free will, Lyotard turns 
to the narrative practices of a South American people called the Cashinahua. When the 
Cashinahua narrator tells a story, he begins by saying: «I am going to tell you the story of X 
[here he inserts the name of the hero] as I have always heard it», and he ends by saying: 
«Here ends the story of X; it was told to you by Y [here he inserts his own name]» (JG, p. 
32). Significantly, the storyteller does not disclose their name at the beginning – 
presenting themselves first as a narratee, a listener, and relay, and thus «not as 
autonomous (…) but, on the contrary, as heteronomous» (ibid.). The pole of the author is 
therefore treated as secondary to that of the addressee and the Cashinahua narrator does 
not pose as the spontaneous or uncaused author of the meaning of the discourse he speaks; 
rather, he «claims to belong to the tradition» (JG, p.33). Indeed, the original author of a 
Cashinahua narrative is, as with almost any folk tale, anonymous. Finally, having heard the 
story, the narratee is required to retell it since to refuse to do so «is a great abomination to 
[the Cashinahua]» (JG, p.35).  
Lyotard implies that the Cashinahua narrative is a metonymic representation of the 
mechanics of all discourse and conscious human action: «as the content of the 
[Cashinahua] narratives makes abundantly clear (…), human beings are not the authors of 
what they tell, that is, of what they do, and that, in point of fact, there never are authors» 
(JG, p.36; my emphasis). For Lyotard, because we are always first addressees, we are 
always first obligated to speak and relay prescriptions – especially when we prescribe 
maxims to ourselves; thus, Lyotard holds that humans are first and foremost 
heteronomous.  
Lyotard also explicitly takes issue with Kant‟s categorical imperative, which posits that 
we are ought to be self-legislative with respect to our moral maxims. Lyotard argues that 
this wrongly assumes the self that prescribes the law to be identical with the self that must 
obey that law – an illegitimate inference that presupposes a unified subject-substance (TD, 
p. 99). The problem, though, is that this is a myth, and these separate selves – one as 
addressor, one as addressee – are radically incommensurable and cannot be formed into a 
unified „I‟; moreover, as we have just seen, the prescribing self is itself first obliged to 
formulate its maxims, and so, for Lyotard, humans are always situated within a chain of 
heteronomous obligation. 
For all of the above reasons, Lyotard states that «the will is never free and freedom does 
not come first» (JG, p. 35); however, immediately after this repudiation, he states, «that 
[one] may say something else later, granted; that then there is will, granted. But this will 
can be exercised only against the backdrop of obligation that comes first» (ibid; my 
emphasis). The Cashinahua narrator, for example, is not a wholly passive conduit for 
tradition – indeed, the better storyteller is the one who embellishes and invents (JG, p.33). 
That humans are never autonomous authors does not «mean they have nothing to do. On 
the contrary they have a thousand things to do, and they must constantly match wits with 
the fate they […] are constantly being given» (JG, p. 36).  
Likewise, though Lyotard claims the identity of an individual is fragmented across 
different linguistic elements, this does not mean that our identity is pinned down; rather, 
he believes that one‟s «mobility in relation to these language games (…) is tolerable» 
(PMC, p. 15). Indeed, these linguistic structures, and the rules they dictate regarding what 
constitutes appropriate linkage, display a certain amount of malleability. For Lyotard, all 
discussions are battles, each of which has their own rules, yet, because these rules are 
necessarily immanent to the discourse in which they are situated (i.e. there are no 
metacriteria), «they allow and encourage the greatest possible flexibility of utterance» 
(PMC, p. 17). Individuals must constantly exploit this and invent new, unexpected moves 
to outwit their interlocutors. The new moves that individuals create within the parameters 
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of these flexible rules, Lyotard calls „innovations‟. These improve the efficiency of the 
discourse and prevent stagnation – for example, artistic discourses continually need new 
and different artworks to discuss so that the vitality of the discourse can be maintained. 
Innovation is then distinguished from what Lyotard calls „paralogism‟, which engenders 
moves that destabilise and bring into question the rules imposed by an existing linguistic 
structure.46 To give a fitting example, Nietzsche‟s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, with its 
rhetorical style transgressed the boundaries of both the philosophical and artistic genres, 
thereby forcing a reassessment of exactly what rules define these discourses.  
Due to their destabilising, dissentient, and often iconoclastic effect, paralogistic moves 
are frequently repressed by other players within the discourse. «Such behaviour», says 
Lyotard, «is terroristic» since it entails 
 
… eliminating, or threatening to eliminate, a player from the language game one shares with him. He is 
silenced or consents, not because he has been refuted, but because his ability to participate has been 
threatened (PMC, pp.63–4). 
 
This reactionary type of move attempts to homogenise individuals by making them 
conform to rigid criteria. As Haber highlights, it «demands that everyone speak in one 
voice» and is terroristic insofar as it tries to „delimit the unbounded nature of the self‟.47 
The creation of new rules, games and genres by paralogy allows the subject to continually 
reposition itself within new linguistic structures, which, in turn, enables it to expand, 
fragment and express its protean nature without restriction. Indeed, Lyotard postulates 
that, despite the „backdrop‟ of heteronomy, it is through this act of creating new moves, 
games and genres, «that something like the imagination, or the will (…) [can] develop» 
(JG, p. 61). Needless to say, then, Lyotard advocates paralogism over innovation since the 
effect of the former is not merely the improved performativity of a genre (although this 
may happen) but, rather, the resistance of terror. 
All this perhaps misleadingly gives the impression that, for Lyotard, the human subject 
can use linguistic conventions as a mere framework for its various acts of free creativity. 
Anne Barron, however, shrewdly observes how Lyotard‟s conception of paralogy and the 
will does not «speak of an essential freedom, or form of initiative that belongs to the 
individual. The possibility of a countermove is presupposed by the existence of a game».48 
Indeed, in Section Two it was found that, for Lyotard, individuals are possessed and 
determined by language («our intentions are tensions exerted by genres»). Far from being 
human acts of will, these paralogistic countermoves or linkages are merely the result of 
unexpected phrases triumphing in the linguistic struggle to concatenate. This then forces 
an existing genre to adapt its rules and assimilate the phase, or, alternatively, it forces the 
emergence of a completely new genre which can assimilate the phrase.  As one of Lyotard‟s 
interviewers has remarked, by Lyotard‟s model, humans appear to be mere «passive 
receptors, manipulated by language, listening to its voice without any possibility of 
influencing it» (TWR, p. 408); to be sure, Lyotard admits, «I don‟t think I‟m an actor or an 
agent» (TWR, p. 409). So, although he unequivocally rejects the idea of an uncaused free 
will, there is a conspicuous and unresolved tension within Lyotard‟s philosophy: on the one 
hand he stresses that there is only a backdrop of obligation and beyond this there are 
things we, as individuals, must actively „do‟; then, on the other, he completely rejects the 
notion of human agency, asserting that all we „do‟ is passively actualise the victorious 
phrases in a battle fought between linguistic elements.49 Nevertheless, despite this bind, 
                                                          
46 See PMC, p.61. See also Readings (1992), p. 73. 
47 Haber (1994), p. 21. 
48 Barron (1992), p. 39. 
49 The linguistic conflict outlined in Section Two therefore promotes the creation of new provisional rules, 
ever stronger „moves‟ and the transformation of genres. It is on these grounds that Emilia Steuerman deems 
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what can be discerned is that Lyotard‟s ideal self is „free‟ in the sense of being an open 
structure and a site where new moves can come into existence, irrespective of whether one 
actively creates them or only passively actualises them. One is thus able to extrapolate that, 
for Lyotard, the free self is one that is free from terror.  
Both Lyotard and Nietzsche reconceive of the self as a multiplicity, view the will as 
something to be developed and reject the idea of metaphysical freedom; however, only the 
latter‟s account of the self can validly be considered agonistic since only it affirms the need 
to unite this multiplicity. Conversely, Lyotard presents the will as something that must be 
employed to create new moves, rules and genres that destabilise and further fragment the 
linguistic structures across which the self is divided – an endeavour that resists all forms of 
totality by keeping this self unbounded and disunited. Once again, then, one bears witness 
to a profound imbalance (uncharacteristic of the agon) in Lyotard‟s philosophy since it 
valorises the disunity of the self without considering the fertility which can arise when one 
unifies in a way that preserves difference. Indeed, freedom, for Lyotard, is freedom from 
imposed unity, whereas, contrariwise, Nietzsche conceives of freedom (qua agency) as 
emerging from imposed unity. What shall now be examined is how Lyotard‟s and 
Nietzsche‟s „political‟ thoughts can each be read as attempts to realise and safeguard their 
divergent conceptions of the free self. 
 
4) Cultural Unity and Agonistic Politics 
 
Both Lyotard and Nietzsche eschew the idea of producing rigid political blueprints since 
such dogmatism runs counter to their calls for self-creativity. With respect to Nietzsche, 
this absence of a concrete model for political praxis has led many critics to polemically 
insist that, ultimately, there is no coherent „Nietzschean‟ political philosophy;50 similarly, 
the lack of a „Lyotardian‟ blueprint has provoked the frustration of some of his 
commentators.51 Nevertheless, both explicitly express politically orientated thoughts which 
directly relate to their respective „theories‟ of freedom. I shall now attempt to defend two 
theses: first, that both their visions of the free self demand a degree of cultural unity and 
domination (irrespective of how much Lyotard wishes to debar this); and, second, that 
unlike Nietzsche‟s thoughts concerning the aristocratic form of social organisation, 
Lyotard‟s „risk-aversive‟ political theory bears more resemblance to misarchism than to the 
agon. 
 
4.1) A Skeleton for Agency 
  
At the end of Section Two it was stated that a secure linguistic framework or „scaffold‟ 
was a prerequisite of human agency – a claim that can now be expanded upon. In BGE 19, 
Nietzsche clearly indicates that a crucial component of freedom is self-reflection: 
«„Freedom of the will‟ – (…) the multifaceted state of pleasure of one who commands (…). 
As such, he enjoys triumph over resistances, but thinks to himself that it was his will alone 
that truly overcame the resistance» (my emphasis). So, as was indicated in the previous 
section, if individuals are to become agents they must be capable of consciously thinking 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Lyotard‟s model of language agonistic ([1992], pp. 111–2). Although these are points of convergence between 
his model and the agon, I would argue that they are insufficient to categorise his model „agonistic‟. Not only 
do the arguments of Section Two still stand, but, furthermore, paralogistic moves and the new rules they 
engender are not celebrated as ways of taking and expressing power so much as ways of resisting power. 
Correspondingly, their victory is not embraced because of the unifying role they play as new, stronger 
organisational rubrics (as one would expect if the model were properly agonistic) – quite the opposite, they 
are valued by Lyotard only as artifices that can be used to undermine stable unities. 
50 See e.g. Shaw (2007); and Hunt (1985). 
51 See e.g. Browning (2000), p. 163; see also Maplas (2003), pp. 104–5. 
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about their actions both before they act (so that they have knowledge of the forthcoming 
act and affirm it as their own choice) and afterwards (so they can identify the act as both 
successful and as their own, thereby creating the affect of efficacious command). Since 
conscious thought occurs only within the strictures of language (GS, 354), a relatively 
stable, dominant sign-system must therefore be in place for the individual to experience 
their freedom as an agent.  
What was also demonstrated in the preceding section was that one‟s ability to fulfil the 
promises one makes to other humans is a necessary condition of sovereign individuality. 
For this to be possible, says Nietzsche, the sovereign individual must be able to «think 
causally, (…) calculate, compute – and before he can do this, man himself will really have 
to become reliable, regular, necessary» (GM, II, 1). Nietzsche‟s emphasis on this need to 
be reliable in the eyes of others, coupled with the need for a stable and communally 
accepted sign-system, highlights the social bedrock in which freedom has its roots; indeed, 
Richard Schacht observes how, in order to become agents, we must first be initiated into a 
variety of established social practices, which allow us »to operate in terms of promises, 
agreements, rules [and] values», and thus, «it is by means of the „social straitjacket‟ that a 
degree of (…) mastery is first achieved».52  
So, not only must there be a dominant and putatively fixed linguistic framework, but 
there must also be a degree of constancy to society itself. To be sure, Nietzsche directly 
associates the kind of self-stability and self-reflection needed for agency with the „well-
constructed‟ community (BGE, 19). To explicate this idea of sound social construction, it 
behoves us to examine Nietzsche‟s earlier thoughts concerning culture. „Culture‟ – which 
the OED defines as «the distinctive ideas, customs, social behaviour, products, or way of 
life of a particular society»53 – is made up of a conglomeration of diverse social practices. 
Nietzsche believes that the cultural diversity of a true culture must exhibit an „internal 
coherence‟ (TP, 33). Here one once again bears witness to Nietzsche‟s paradigmatic call for 
unification: «a culture has to be in all reality a single living unity» (UM, II, 4). According to 
Nietzsche, just as the individual possesses a multiplicity of heterogeneous drives, so does 
any community – drives for knowledge, happiness, territorial expansion, artistic 
excellence, and so on. Similar to his philosophy of the self, Nietzsche believed these drives, 
along with the social practices corresponding to them, needed to be kept in a state of vital 
proportion – i.e. be unified in their diversity. Nietzsche, indeed, commends the ancient 
Greeks for their „unifying mastery‟, which allowed them to achieve exactly this (TP, 46). 
Yet Nietzsche does not think modern Occidental societies have achieved such cohesion. 
The vehement tyranny of the „unlimited knowledge drive‟ has prohibited any form of 
cultural proportion. Additionally, though, he also holds that a genuine culture must exhibit 
aesthetic unity, that is, a «unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of the 
people». In opposition to this, however, he describes modern „culture‟ as a „motley‟ and 
«chaotic jumble of styles» (UM, I, 1).  Nietzsche‟s wider argument seems to be that, due to 
the cultural instability and „agitatedness‟ which gives rise to this disarray of styles and 
drives, individuals lack the firm social platform needed for agency; thus,  «higher culture 
can no longer allow its fruits to mature» (HH, I, 285). So, if a community is to be 
fructiferous and bear sovereign individuals, its cultural practices must be stable and 
unified.54 
                                                          
52 Schacht (1983), p. 295. In emphasising the indispensability of this social platform it is also vital not to 
overlook how, in his account of the free individual, Nietzsche also emphasises the importance of a) being able 
to deconstruct and reshape these cultural practices, and b) being asocial, solitary or even antisocial (cf., D, 
177, 323, 443, and 491). 
53 „Culture, n.‟, in OED: 
Online,<http://oed.com/view/Entry/45746?rskey=kWUlSo&result=1&isAdvanced=false> [accessed 5 
August, 2011]. 
54 See Warren (1991), pp. 46–55. Cf. WP, 677; KSA 12:7 [3]. 
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The ancient Greek agon would appear to have endowed this kind of unity since 
disparate cultural practices were cohered under the common objectives of a) embodying 
the ideal of productive conflict, and b) working toward the wellbeing of the social whole. In 
his later work, however, Nietzsche steered away from the Hellenic manifestation of the 
agon (with its proximity to democratic forms of government) and began to propound what 
one might call „agonistic aristocratism‟. Daniel Breazeale remarks how, according to 
Nietzsche, «[c]ultural unity is impossible apart from some sort of mastery (…). In order for 
culture to be possible at all there must be hierarchy, obedience, subordination, and 
subjugation.»55 What Breazeale fails to note, however, is the shift in how Nietzsche 
conceives of this mastery: whereas in Homer’s Contest Nietzsche intimates that any citizen 
should rightfully be able to enter the agonistic contest to become a „master‟, in his later 
work he conceives of agonistic competition as being restricted to a «master race, the future 
„masters of the earth‟; – a new, tremendous aristocracy» (WP, 960; KSA 12:2[57]).  
Nietzsche reasons that such a caste based separation is necessary because genuine 
human agency requires the „pathos of distance‟ – i.e. the ruling caste must be stoically 
indifferent to the tribulations of the subservient caste, thus allowing them to view this 
inferior majority as tools to be commanded and exploited without humanitarian 
restraint.56 The implicit argument here is that without such obeying tools one cannot fully 
claim to be an agent since one cannot feel the affect of command in the highest degree. 
Moreover, and what is crucial to our current study, this unimpeded ability to command 
provides the ruling caste with the means to organise the anarchy of society‟s drives and 
unify culture under a dominant will. 
The upshot of Nietzsche‟s radical aristocratism is that «[m]utually refraining from 
injury, violence, and exploitation, placing your will on a par with the other‟s» (BGE, 259), 
that is, the principles of the agon, are confined to the nobility. Indeed, Frederick Appel has 
even asserted that this radical aristocratism «is the meaning of the Nietzschean agon.»57 
This, however, is a grand claim – one that seems to downplay the democratic connotations 
of Nietzsche‟s earlier writings concerning the agon.58 Whether Nietzsche‟s agon principally 
supports liberal democracy or radical aristocracy is a major debate for which there is not 
time to enter into here. But what can be seen is that, by Nietzsche‟s agonistic aristocratism, 
only a select few individuals possess the sovereignty and freedom needed to act as agents, 
and, furthermore, that this privileged minority only attain and express their freedom by 
dominating, unifying and imposing their evaluative criteria on the diversity of cultural 
practices. 
This call for a master race built upon an ethos of noble and fertile competition is 
reinforced by Nietzsche‟s denouncement of what he calls „misarchism‟: «the democratic 
idiosyncrasy of being against everything that dominates and wants to dominate» (GM, II, 
12). Acampora argues that, rather than being a celebration of all (including sadistic) 
domination on Nietzsche‟s part, this is more accurately interpreted as an admonishment of 
a particular species of domination. Since the democratic state cannot tolerate any risk to its 
founding belief in equality, it abhors and outlaws all forms of domination; yet this 
proscription is paradoxically enacted in a totalitarian manner. In this way, says Acampora, 
democracy is „risk-aversive‟ because «it cannot permit the most serious contest to its 
ideals.»59  
As Section One explained, the strength of the Hellenic agon paradoxically rests upon the 
totalising precept that there ought to be no totalising precepts; nevertheless, though this 
                                                          
55 Breazeale (1999), p.xxiv. 
56 See BGE, 257; AC, 43; and GM, I, 2. 
57 Appel (1999), p. 140; cf. Dombovsky (2004), p.124. 
58 Connotations Hatab (1995) explores in his attempt to formulate a Nietzschean defence of democracy (see 
esp. pp. 78–93). 
59 Acampora (2003a), p. 380. 
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may appear, prima facie, like misarchism, it is not so. In the case of the agon, though 
people with tyrannical intent are ostracised if, upon victory, they attempt to establish a 
„monopoly of preponderance‟, they and their totalitarian aspirations are readily admitting 
into the agonistic space. For Nietzsche, the agon thus permits contestation to its founding 
principles, while misarchism suppresses all such challenges. Thus, productive conflict and 
the freedom it engenders, as has been stressed throughout this study, perpetually teeters 
or, as Nietzsche might say, „dances‟, on the edge of pre-Homeric tyranny. Indeed, 
Acampora contends that in praxis Nietzsche‟s agonism would not be able to withstand this 
threat and, since it lacks stability, it is therefore „not viable for politics‟.60 
It is misleading to assume that Nietzsche‟s thoughts were, in the first place, intended as 
a „viable‟ political model. Remedying culture was Nietzsche‟s priority, and, he states, «that 
which is great in the cultural sense has been unpolitical, even anti-political» (TI, What the 
Germans Lack, 4) – he even describes himself as «the last anti-political German» (EH, 
Why I am so Wise, 3) The societal and individual drive for politics is, according to 
Nietzsche, caught in a zero-sum game with the antagonistic and more worthwhile drive for 
a strong unified culture.61 Thus, I would argue that Nietzsche‟s politically orientated 
meditations should first and foremost be interpreted as a heuristic attempt to uncover the 
governmental preconditions of a true, unified culture – one that can act as a springboard 
for human agency. So, irrespective of whether the ancient Greek arrangement or radical 
aristocratism best embodies Nietzsche‟s political perspective, it can certainly be claimed 
that he envisaged the healthy society as one constructed around the principle of productive 
contest. This section has additionally foregrounded two other fundamental points: first, 
freedom as agency – even if limited to a select minority – is only made possible by unifying 
culture and affirming the need for dominating politico-cultural forces that are able to 
impose this unity; and second, we must therefore embrace the danger of tyranny 
concomitant with the agon and strong rule if sovereign individuals are to be realised. 
Lyotard, however, arrives at some quite antithetical conclusions, as we shall now see. 
 
4.2) Lyotard and the Ineluctability of Domination  
  
What the previous section demonstrated was that if Lyotard‟s vision of freedom – 
understood as the self‟s unbounded freedom from terror – is to be made a social reality, 
then the drive for paralogy needs to be able to express itself without restraint. In TD, 
Lyotard explains that every wrong that is incurred when a differend is decided over «ought 
to be able to be put into phrases» (TD, p. 13). So, every time a dispute arises between two 
parties for which there is no criteria that can justly be applied to both, the creation of new 
idioms and rules for linkage must be permitted so that the differend can be witnessed and 
the terroristic silencing of one party can be avoided. Since there is no pre-existing 
metacriteria available to judge between differends – that is, there is no transcendent, fixed 
or justifiably dominant definition of what „justice‟ means – Lyotard‟s ideal judge, like 
Aristotle‟s, must seemingly adjudicate without pre-given criteria. It is the affirmation of 
this absence of „God-given‟ measure that characterises Lyotard‟s „paganism‟: «when I say 
„pagan‟, I mean godless. And the reason we (…) need to be taught a lesson is that we still 
want justice. That is the point of my instructive story: justice in a godless society» (LP, p. 
123). 
Each genre, language game and, to be sure, every different culture holds „justice‟ to 
signify something different, and with no transcendent measure they would all appear to be 
equally valid. Lyotard thus holds that there is, and should remain, a pluralistic „multiplicity 
of justices‟ (JG, p.100). The ideal pagan would therefore never try to impose one standard 
                                                          
60 Ibid., p. 388. 
61 See also D, 179. 
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of justice. To dominate in such a fashion is, for Lyotard, to try to unify the totality of 
individuals under one set of criteria – to forcibly homogenise the heterogeneity of subjects, 
to stifle difference and invention, and, in so doing, to terroristically circumscribe the self. 
Honneth observes how this idea of a multiplicity of justices «anticipates a social condition 
in which all social forms of life enjoy the same right to autonomy and to the unimpeded 
development of their creativity», and, he continues, «the same thought is presented as a 
postulate of the egalitarian free-play of cultural difference»62 – a stance clearly opposed to 
that of Nietzsche. 
There are, however, as Nietzsche has already brought to our attention, dangers involved 
with such a radical repudiation of transcendent models of justice; indeed, Lyotard‟s 
imagined interlocutor in LP points out that in doing so «you throw the door wide open to 
tyranny» (LP, p. 135). The „multiplicity of justices‟ espoused by Lyotard brings with it the 
danger of totalitarianism because, under it, one must accept even a tyrannical conception 
of justice as one equally valid formulation amongst others in the pagan multiplicity. 
Lyotard accordingly admits that „one does risk falling back into a sort of indifferentism that 
is the bad side of [paganism] (JG, p. 96). Moreover, one must grant legitimacy to the 
prevailing understanding of justice within one‟s own culture – that is, one must accept rule 
by convention since there is no other way of deciding what type of rule is just. Lyotard 
warns us, however, that «rule by convention would require that one accept, let‟s get to the 
bottom of things right away, even Nazism. After all, since there was near unanimity upon 
it, from where could one judge that it was not just?» (JG, p. 74; my emphasis). The 
unregulated affirmation of difference which characterises radical paganism therefore 
seems to counterproductively facilitate its own collapse into pre-Homeric tyranny.  
Unlike Nietzsche, however, Lyotard is unwilling to tolerate the threat of totalitarianism. 
Lyotard wants to promote a conception of justice that can sustain diversity and disunity 
while simultaneously supplying a ground from which terroristic cultures and cultural 
practices can be legitimately attacked. To do so, Lyotard appropriates Kant‟s theory of the 
Idea: «a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in 
sense-experience».63 An Idea is formed when we take a concept of the understanding for 
which we do have intuitions, for example the concept „human‟, and we use reason to 
expand it so that it incorporates all possible instances of this object, thereby forming an 
Idea – for example, the Idea „humanity‟, for which there can be no intuition since we can 
never experience the totality of human beings. In Lyotard‟s eyes, this Idea of the social 
totality plays a regulative role with respect to moral action. This is because in Kant‟s 
account of the categorical imperative one must have an Idea of this social whole in order to 
be able to determine what effect one‟s maxim would have if it became universal law for this 
totality.64 A just action would then be one that is in accordance with a law under which 
humanity could potentially be unified. Nonetheless, since one can never have an intuition 
of this totality, this Idea is not «an empirical totality, but a practical totality (…); it is a sort 
of horizon that performs a regulatory role with respects to action» (JG, p. 46). 
Lyotard suggests that this regulatory Idea should be transformed for the purposes of 
postmodernism: «it is no longer a matter, for us, of reflecting upon what is just or unjust 
against the horizon of a social totality, but, on the contrary, against the horizon of a 
multiplicity or of a diversity» (JG, p. 87). Thus, a prescription, action, political institution 
or local conception of justice that respects multiplicity and cultural diversity would then 
rightfully be considered just. Conversely, „absolute injustice‟ can be defined as «that which 
prohibits that the question of the just and the unjust be, and remain, raised» (JG, p. 67) – 
i.e. anything that suffocates difference and the multiplicity of justices.  
                                                          
62 Honneth (1985), p. 154. 
63 Kant (2007), A 327. 
64 See Kant (1997), 4:402. 
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Lyotard conceives of this „justice of multiplicity‟ as an aegis under which the pagan 
multiplicity of justices can be protected from terror. At a specifically linguistic level, 
though, «the Idea of justice will consist in preserving the purity of each game, that is, for 
example, in insuring that the discourse of truth be considered as a „specific‟ language game, 
that narration be played by its „specific‟ rules» (JG, p. 96). This conservation of 
heterogeneity is meant to foreclose the terroristic unity that an imperialistic game or genre 
tries to impose across the entirety of discursive and cultural practices by subjecting them 
to its evaluative criteria. In trying to block the struggle between heterogeneous games or 
genres, Lyotard hopes that the dominance of a single set of rules can be prevented and the 
creative struggle to invent new rules that takes place immanently, within these linguistic 
elements, can be secured.  
In this way, Lyotard implies that a just system of political governance would ensure that 
a diversity of discursive and cultural practices is maintained, one in which rules and 
valuations are produced immanently through conflict between participants, not imposed 
from without. This does raise a variety of issues regarding the pragmatics of such a politics 
– could a society really be organised and governed solely according to the principle of 
multiplicity? Indeed, on this issue Lyotard admits ignorance: «here I must say I don‟t 
know» (JG, p. 94).  
Although one must bear these practical questions in mind, it is the contradiction at the 
heart of Lyotard‟s notion of justice with which I am here concerned. Lyotard‟s vision of a 
society free from any evaluative criteria that have pretensions of universality exhibits a 
performative contradiction because 
 
It is assured, paradoxically enough, by a prescriptive of universal value. It prescribes the observance of 
the singular justice of each game […]. It authorises the “violence” that accompanies the work of the 
imagination [in creating new rules]. It prohibits terror (JG, p.100; my emphasis). 
 
The first problem is stark: the pagan multiplicity of justices is, as Bennington tersely 
highlights, «only made possible by the justice of multiplicity which it must condemn as 
totalising.»65 Moreover, the absolute purity and diversity of which Lyotard speaks is 
foreclosed by the logic of Lyotard‟s proposals. This is because Lyotard‟s justice of 
multiplicity, which must be classified as a representative of the prescriptive game, can only 
attempt to maintain the purity of games by evaluating, judging and regulating them all 
according to its criteria for measurement. The prescriptive game and Lyotard‟s own 
metajustice thereby dominates, infiltrates and comprises the purity and sovereignty of all 
these games along with the multiplicity of local justices it adjudicates over. Finally, insofar 
as Lyotard‟s justice of multiplicity does this, it inadvertently unifies these disparate 
elements under one criterion – contradictorily, the criterion of disunity and diversity. 
Indeed, Lyotard is universally prescribing, authorising and proscribing; as Thébaud 
trenchantly informs him: «[h]ere you are talking like the great prescriber himself‟ (ibid) – 
a comment which, after eliciting laughter from both dialogists, brings the text to a close. 
Nevertheless, there is something unheimlich about this laughter: unification and 
domination are actions, which have, as Freud might say, „undergone repression and then 
returned from it».66 Certainly, what JG reveals is that domination is in fact ineradicable. 
Unable to tolerate the risk of tyranny entailed by his radical paganism, Lyotard‟s futile 
attempt to proscribe hegemony and imposed unity inevitably means, reproducing precisely 
what it is being proscribed.67 Thus, domination and cultural unity are necessary conditions 
not only for Nietzsche‟s conception of freedom as agency, but also for Lyotard‟s 
postmodern understanding of freedom as the self‟s freedom from terror. 
                                                          
65  Bennington (1984), p. 69.  
66 Freud (1955), p. 245. 
67 A. Weber (1985), p. 113. 
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In Section Two, we saw how, for Lyotard, different genres and cultural domains try to 
regulate, overpower and dominate one another. Lyotard maintains that minimising this 
kind of encroachment (by ensuring heterogeneous domains retain their purity) will 
prevent the terror of imposed unity and reified conceptions of the self. This in turn, he 
thinks, will grant individuals a greater opportunity to compete against one another (or, we 
should say, to passively actualise the competition between linguistic elements) within 
these distinct cultural spheres, to create new paralogistic moves, new rules and genres, to 
develop their will and further fragment their unbounded selves. However, he wishes to 
pacify the arguably more prominent, overarching conflict that takes place between these 
supposedly heterogeneous contests – a conflict that arises as individuals, groups, genres an 
specific cultural domains vie to forcibly unify culture under a single will, stake and 
measure. Whereas Nietzsche embraces this grand conflict and the cultural unity inflicted 
by its impermanent victor (so long as it does not persevere to the point of stagnation), 
Lyotard aims toward completely extinguishing it by isolating the warring parties; and so, in 
light of this, I would argue that Lyotard‟s wider political thought cannot justifiably be 
called agonistic.  
Sam Weber, one of the few to have critically compared Lyotard‟s „agonistics‟ against HC, 
suggests that, whereas there is a «tension between unity and disunity» present in 
Nietzsche‟s account of the agon, Lyotard «proscrib[es] this ambivalence in the name of 
purity and singularity of each game» and therefore his political thought cannot be labelled 
agonistic in any Nietzschean sense of the term.68 It should be noted, though, as we have 
just seen above, that there is such a tension in Lyotard‟s account of justice. However, the 
crucial difference is that this tension is not based on a conscious affirmation of unity and a 
deliberate attempt to balance it against disunity (as Nietzsche‟s is). Instead, since Lyotard 
cannot tolerate even the threat of tyranny, he endeavours, as Weber highlights, to 
completely proscribe cultural harmony in favour of dissonance and disgregation. 
Consequently, the tension that does then inevitably resurfaces, is unintentional and, in its 
normative bent, unbalanced (massively favouring disunity and trying to repress unity). To 
be sure, Lyotard‟s political thought is, in actuality, markedly misarchistic: it dominates 
totally by railing «against everything that dominates and wants to dominate», and, unlike 
the genuinely agonistic arrangement, is unashamedly „risk-aversive‟.  
 
Concluding Remarks: (R)evaluating Misarchism 
 
One of the primary objectives of this paper was to bring into relief the points of 
convergence and divergence between Nietzsche‟s and Lyotard‟s attitudes toward conflict. 
Having traced the continuity to be found in their philosophies of the self, and eventuates in 
their political thought, I have argued that one bears witness to two opposed paradigms: 
with Nietzsche one uncovers a profound emphasis – one representative of the agon – on 
the need for poise and the tolerance of danger; contrariwise, throughout Lyotard‟s 
advocacy of conflict one finds a sustained repression of cultural unity and domination. I 
have accordingly contended that it is misrepresentative to label Lyotard‟s philosophy 
„agonistic‟ if we are to understand this term in its Nietzschean context (as his ambiguous 
citation of HC in PMC seemingly encourages us to).  
Certainly, Lyotard has striven to transport the signifier „agonistic‟ from what he would 
likely consider to be Nietzsche‟s overly fascistic philosophy, and reinscribe it within his 
own postmodern discourse –  reinterpreting it as denoting any struggle that resists 
domination and stable unity. However, even when analysed in isolation, Lyotard‟s 
idiosyncratic „theory‟ of „agonistics‟ has revealed itself to be intrinsically problematic: 
combative social relations are promoted as a means of inhibiting universal legislation and 
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© Logoi.ph – Journal of Philosophy – ISSN 2420-9775 
N. I , 3, 2015 – Playing and Thinking 
 
98 
 
hegemony, yet this society is only insured by his hypocritically universal and domineering 
justice of multiplicity. On this point, it may pay to heed the warnings of Zarathustra: 
«Mistrust all those who speak much of their justice! (…) do not forget that all they lack to 
be pharisees is – power!» (Z, II, On the Tarantulas).  
Though this attack on the partisans of equality is perhaps a little too dramatic to be 
wholly directed at Lyotard, it underscores the fact that, even with people or theories that 
appear vehemently opposed to totalitarianism, one must be wary of the ever-present will to 
domination.  
Supremacy and coerced unity are indelible features of the world in which we live. 
Indeed, from a Nietzschean viewpoint, Lyotard could be said to «thereby [affirm] another 
world than that of life, nature, and history; and insofar as [he] affirm[s] this „other world‟, 
must [he] not by the same token deny its counterpart, this world, our world» (GS, 344). 
Hence, one could view Lyotard as practicing incomplete nihilism, where, although one 
does away with worn out religious valuations and replaces them with new ones, as 
Heidegger tells us, one «still posits the latter always in the old position of authority.»69 
Lyotard conceives of a godless pagan society, yet the doctrinaire values he formulates in 
God‟s wake are just as idealistic and „other worldly‟ as those they supplant – as Murphy 
rightly states, «Nietzsche would probably find Lyotard too liberal, too Christian.»70 
However, by way of postscript, we should briefly consider whether Lyotard‟s postmodern 
misarchism might not still play a role of positive value within the Nietzschean framework. 
It is in an aphorism entitled Ennoblement through degeneration (HH, I, 224), that one 
uncovers a potential a place for Lyotard‟s misarchism. Here Nietzsche states that the 
danger facing any „strong community‟ – i.e. one founded on «firm-charactered 
individuals» – «is that of gradually increasing inherited stupidity such as haunts stability 
like a shadow». Nietzsche proposes that, when a destabilising injury is inflicted upon this 
increasingly inflexible society, it can effect a „loosening up‟. Since society then has to adapt 
around this injury, the «whole body is as it were inoculated with something new»; thus, 
whilst «the strongest natures preserve the type, the weaker help it to evolve».  
Although Nietzsche advocates continual revaluation and self-creation in tandem with a 
dynamic form of cultural unity, it is very easy to see how his promotion of regularity and 
reliability as features of the strong willed, sovereign individual invites exactly the kind of 
social paralysis he so often scorns. As we have also seen, the agonistic arrangement has a 
proclivity toward tyranny. In both cases the cohesion of culture can stagnate. Analogously, 
one could imagine a wrestling contest that has lost its fluidity since one wrestler has caught 
the other in a stable, strong and unrelenting hold. In situations such as these, intervention 
and separation is needed to „loosen up‟ this static unity; and with this in mind the referee 
breaks the contestants apart. 
This is how I suggest we ought to think of Lyotard‟s misarchism – as a dominating force 
that can temporarily allow different cultures and cultural practices respite from oppressive 
criteria such as, currently, for example, that of capitalist economics. Nonetheless, this drive 
for misarchism is not a transcendent judge – it is merely another contestant who, in their 
lust to rule, has assumed the role of umpire. Though perhaps temporarily weakening or 
injurious to society, a politics and zeitgeist dominated by postmodern misarchism – that is, 
by a respect for difference and resistance to hegemony – could, therefore, fulfil a valuable 
function. It would serve a purpose similar to that of ostracism (whilst remaining more 
applicable to contemporary politics), creating an environment ripe for fresh agonistic 
contest and the evolution of new, vigorous unities. Thus, since opportunities for 
experiencing the affect of command are maximised in an enlivened agonistic arena of this 
sort, a temporary Lyotardian „freedom from imposed unity‟ (except that imposed by the 
                                                          
69 Heidegger (1977), p. 69. 
70 Murphy (2001), p. 176. 
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separating force) could in fact clear the way for a Nietzschean „freedom as agency‟. 
Nonetheless, if the neutering and degeneration of culture is to be avoided, misarchism 
would have to remain only a short-term, regulative moment in the evolutionary cycle of a 
community; however, because of its inherently risk-aversive character, creating ways of 
ensuring this would, doubtless, be a complex task. 
This is but a mere adumbration of how one might begin to productively synthesise or, 
rather, balance together, certain aspects of Lyotard and Nietzsche – one that raises 
questions and resistances that exceed the bounds of this study. Within these bounds, 
though, what has been illumined is the challenge that faces contemporary theorists of 
culture, politics and society more generally – namely, that of finding novel and relevant 
ways to think about and realise human freedom (e.g. by overcoming the linguistic obstacles 
to agency or ensuring the provisionality of misarchism), ways that actively mobilise and 
manage domination and unity to society‟s advantage. 
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